

195/7
THE
Maritime Campaign of 1778.

A
COLLECTION
OF
ALL THE PAPERS
RELATIVE TO
THE OPERATIONS
OF THE
ENGLISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.
TO WHICH ARE ADDED,
STRICTURES
UPON THE

Publications made in *France*, by Order of the Ministry,

Concerning the ENGAGEMENT on the 27th of July;

ILLUSTRATED WITH

CHARTS AND PLANS,

On SIX COPPER-PLATES,

By J. M. a LIEUTENANT in the FLEET.

Veniendum tunc ad arma, cum locum apud adversarios Justitia non potest reperire.

Saying of Theodoric King of Italy.


L O N D O N:

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Successor to the late T. JEFFERIES, Geographer to the King, CHARING CROSS, 1779.

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BY THE

EDITOR.

THE Maritime Campaign of 1778, though not very decisive, becomes one of the most interesting in the Naval History of our Country; and when the Pretences, the Schemes, and the Threats of the French Court are considered, there is no Englishman who can peruse with indifference the detail of that Campaign. The Ministers of France having needlessly involved their Country in a War whose beginning is already signalized by the Ruin of their Maritime Trade, and by the Destruction of their Fishery, it behoves them to flatter the people with imaginary tales; and their business now is to palliate a political blunder, whose cruel consequences they begin to perceive. Unable to persuade their Nation of the necessity of an iniquitous War, they must try to deceive and intoxicate them with chimerical successes, and more chimerical hopes.—Amongst the numerous Performances published for that laudable purpose, under their direction, those that have appeared concerning the late Engagement in the Atlantic are not the less ingenious. They have given occasion to the Collection now presented to the
Public,

Public, which comprehends all the original papers relative to the operations of both Fleets, and of single Ships of War in Europe. In order to illustrate these papers, the following Plates have been annexed, viz.

- I. *Chart of the Cruise of the King's Fleet from the 17th to the 31st of July.*
- II. *Chart of the Cruise of the King's Fleet from the 26th of August to the 28th of October.*
- III. *Plan of the Movements of the King's Fleet against the French Fleet before and during the Engagement.*
- IV. *Plan of the Movements of the King's Fleet after the Engagement.*
- V. *Plan of the Engagement as published at Paris by Order of the Ministry.*
- VI. *Plan of the Engagement as published at Brest by Order of the Ministry.*

N. B. The Two Plans (No. III. and IV.) relative to the Engagement being laid down according to the Observations and Log-Books of several of the Ships, impartially compared together, it is presumed that they are as exact as the nature of the subject would admit of.

E R R A T A.

PAGE 8. In the CENTER DIVISION, the *Bienfaisant* should be placed before the *Courageux*, and the *Yarmouth* in the LARBOARD DIVISION omitted.

15. In the CENTER DIVISION, after the *Thunderer*, read *Suffolk*, Captain *Duncan*—74 Guns, 600 Men.

21 In the STRICTURES, line 4, for *pain*, read *praise*.



I N T R O.

INTRODUCTION.

On the 13th of March, 1778, the following *Rescript* was delivered to
Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State for the Southern Department,
by the *Marquis de Noailles*, the French Ambassador.

TH E under-signed Ambassador of his Most Christian Majesty has received express orders
to make the following declaration to the court of London:

THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, who are in full possession of independence, as
pronounced by them on the 4th of July, 1776; having proposed to the King to consolidate,
by a formal convention, the connection begun to be established between the two nations, the re-
spective plenipotentiaries have signed a treaty of friendship and commerce, designed to serve
as a foundation for their mutual good correspondence.

His Majesty being determined to cultivate the good understanding subsisting between *France*
and *Great Britain*, by every means compatible with its dignity; and the good of his subjects,
thinks it necessary to make this proceeding known to the court of *London*, and to declare at
the same time, that the contracting parties have paid great attention not to stipulate any ex-
clusive advantages in favour of the French nation; and that the UNITED STATES have re-
served the liberty of treating with every nation whatever, upon the footing of equality and
reciprocity:

In making this communication to the court of *London*, the King is firmly persuaded, he
will find new proofs of his Majesty's constant and sincere disposition for peace; and that his
Britannic Majesty, animated by the same sentiments, will equally avoid every thing that may
alter their good harmony; and that he will particularly take effectual measures to prevent the
commerce between his Majesty's subjects and the UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA from
being interrupted, and to cause all the usages received between commercial nations to be, in
this respect, observed; and all those rules which can be said to subsist between the crowns of
France and *Great Britain*.

In this just confidence, the under signed Ambassador thinks it superfluous to acquaint the
British Minister, that the King his Master, being determined to protect effectually the lawful
commerce of his subjects, and to maintain the dignity of his flag, his Majesty has, in conse-
quence, taken eventual measures in concert with the UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA.
London, March 13, 1778.

Signed,

Le M. DE NOAILLES.

In consequence of the above declaration, the King recalled *Lord Stormont*, his Ambassador,
from the French court, and soon after the *Marquis de Noailles* had orders from *Versailles* to quit
that of *London*. Orders were sent to equip a fleet at *Portsmouth*, not only to protect our trade,
but also to oppose the French fleet, then ready in *Brest* harbour, and to defend the coasts of
this kingdom, which the French threatened with an invasion; the command of the British
armament was given to the Hon. *Augustus Keppel*.

B

MARI.

MAR 1

Maritime Campaign of 1778.

ON the 12th of June, Admiral Keppel sailed from St. Helen's on a Cruise, with the following Ships.

LINE of BATTLE on the 12th of June, 1778.

FIRST DIVISION.

<i>Ships</i>	<i>Commanders</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>	
Monarch	Captain Rowley	74	600	
Hector	Sir John Hamilton, Bart.	74	600	
Exeter	Captain Nott	64	500	
Queen	{ Sir Rob. Harland, Bart. }	90	750	{ Vice Adm. of the Red.
	{ Captain Prescott }			
Shrewsbury	Sir John Lockhart Ross,	74	600	
Cumberland	Captain Peyton	74	600	
Berwick	Hon. Keith Stewart	74	600	
Sterling Castle	Capt. Lloyd	64	500	

SECOND DIVISION.

Courageux	Rt. Hon. Lord Mulgrave	74	600	
Sandwich	Capt. Edwards	90	750	
Valiant	Hon. John Leveson Gower	74	600	
Victory	{ The Hon. Aug. Keppel Rear Adm. Campbell, first Capt. to the Admiral Capt. Faulkner }	100	894	{ Adm. of the Blue and Com. in Chief.
Foudroyant	Captain Jarvis	80	650	
Prince George	Sir John Lindsay, K. B.	90	750	
Bienfaitant	Captain McBride	64	500	

THIRD DIVISION.

Elizabeth	Hon. Henry Maitland	74	600	
Robust	Capt. Hood	74	600	
Ocean	{ Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart. }	90	750	{ Vice Adm. of the Blue.
	{ Capt. Laforey }			
America	Rt. Hon. Lord Longford	64	500	
Egmont	Capt. Allen	74	600	
Ramilies	Capt. Digby	74	600	

Arethusa, Fox and Proserpine Frigates
Alert and Meredith armed Cutters
Vulcan Fireship

The fleet was joined soon after by the Formidable of 90 guns, Capt. Bazely, and the Belleisle of 64, Capt. Brooks; and on the 18th and 20th of the same month Admiral Keppel wrote the three following letters to Mr. Stephens, Secretary to the Admiralty.

S I R,

S-I R,

Victory, at Sea, June 18, 1778.

A LITTLE before twelve o'clock yesterday, the fleet being in a line of battle, steering S. S. W. the wind at west, and the *Lizard* bearing N. 44. 00. W. distant 25 miles, we observed two ships seemingly reconnoitering the fleet, with two tenders accompanying them; I immediately directed the whole fleet to chase, and between five and six in the evening the *Milford* had got close along-side the leewardmost ship, a large French frigate; I made the signal for the ships chasing to bring down their chase to me, which *Sir William Burnaby* could not, by civil words, get the French officer to allow him to do; but upon the *Hector's* drawing near upon her, and firing a gun shot, she stood to her, and the *Hector* then made sail with her towards the fleet. The other French ship was closely pursued by the *Arctusa*, and *Alert* cutter, and, at some distance a stern of them, the *Valiant* and *Monarch*.

I am not able to inform their lordships in this letter, relative to that chase, more than that an officer got to me this morning, from the *Valiant*, who had been in the boat the whole night; his Captain directed him to inform me, that he should have returned agreeable to the signal to leave off chase, but that he observed the French frigate had given battle to the *Arctusa*.

At nine o'clock last night I sent *Sir Charles Douglas* to leeward to the *Hector* and *America*, to let their Captains know, it was my orders they brought the French frigate under the *Victory's* stern; and *Sir Charles Douglas* was charged from me, to express every civility to the French Captain, and to inform him that I should see him when the ships and frigate got up to the fleet in the morning; in the mean time he was also to attend the frigate, unmolested, up to me; but, to my astonishment, this morning about nine o'clock, I observed the French ship seemingly going upon the other tack; one of the ships that was attending her fired a shot across her, which was immediately followed by the French frigate's discharging her whole broadside and musquetry into the *America*, at the very moment *Lord Longford* was upon the gunwale talking to the French Captain in the most civil strain; several of the shot struck the *America*, and wounded four of her people: the French Captain then struck his colours; his behaviour merited the fire of the *America*, but *Lord Longford's* humanity and prudence prevailed, much to his credit, over his resentment.

I hope I have not done improperly in sending the frigate into *Plymouth*: the circumstance of her behaviour, and the other French frigate giving battle to the *Arctusa*, has been a justification to myself for seizing her and sending her into port.

I am, S I R,

Your most obedient and very humble Servant,

A. K E P P E L.

P. S. The French frigate is called the *Licorne* of 32 guns and 230 men.*Victory, at sea, June 20, 1778, at noon, the Lizard, N. 37:00 E. 19 leagues.*

S I R,

B EFORE noon of yesterday we saw the *Valiant* and *Monarch*, who had chased from the fleet on the 17th, coming down; the *Valiant* with a crippled ship in tow, which we soon perceived was the *Arctusa*, with her main-mast gone, and much shattered in other respects.

The *Arctusa* had come up with her chase on the evening of the 17th; she proved a large French frigate with heavy metal (the *Belle Poule*;) Captain *Marshall* requested of the French Captain to bring to, and informed him, he had orders to conduct him to his Admiral, who wished to speak to him; both which requests the French officer peremptorily refused to comply with; Captain *Marshall* then fired a shot across the frigate, upon which the French Captain instantaneously fired his whole broadside into the *Arctusa*, who was at that time very close along side, which brought on an action on both sides, which continued for upwards of two hours; the *Arctusa* being much shattered in her masts, sails and rigging, and there being very little wind to govern her, she was thrown into such a situation, as not to be able to get her head towards the French ship, notwithstanding Captain *Marshall's* utmost endeavours to do so: the French ship's head being in with the land, and getting her foresail set, she stood into a small bay, where boats at day-light came out, and towed her into safety.

Captain *Marshall* appears to have conducted himself in the whole of this matter with the greatest spirit and gallantry, and speaks with great satisfaction of the behaviour of his officers and

and ship's company. The *Arethusa* had eight men killed, and thirty-six wounded; the loss of the French must be considerable.

I must not omit in this relation to acquaint their lordships, that Captain *Fairfax*, in the *Alert* cutter, has had his share in the business; he got along-side of a schooner of ten carriage guns and ten swivels that attended the frigate that engaged the *Arethusa*; upon his requesting the commander of her to stand to the fleet, he made him answer, that he should do as the frigate did; and, upon the frigate's firing upon the *Arethusa*, fired his guns into the *Alert*; Captain *Fairfax* immediately run on board of him, and they continued in that situation in close fight, upwards of an hour, when the French vessel surrendered. Captain *Fairfax* killed him five men, and mortally wounded seven; the *Alert* had four men wounded, two of them, it is apprehended mortally.

Several French merchant ships passed through the fleet yesterday unmolested: I did not think proper in any wise to interrupt them in their commerce. *Ushant* was then in sight from the mast head.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

A. K E P P E L.

S I R,

Victory, at Sea, June 20, 1778.

EARLY in the morning of the 18th, a ship in the N. W. quarter was seen standing into the fleet, but soon hauled away; The *Foudroyant*, *Courageux*, and *Robust*, were sent in pursuit of her; and having repaired, as well as time would permit, the *Milford's* damages, which she received by the French frigate's having, while in conversation, sheered on board her, she was likewise sent in chase. In the morning of the 19th, the *Proserpine* had joined; whom I also directed to chase; very light winds, and easterly: before twelve, the frigates and other ships were drawn close up with the chase, a French frigate, and the signal being made to the ships to bring the chase into the fleet, she was brought in accordingly, the French officer having no means whatever to avoid what has happened to him. From the behaviour of the French frigate the *Licorne* on the 18th in the morning, I judged it my duty to detain this ship likewise. I directed Captain *Hood*, of the *Robust*, to take the officers out of the ship, and distribute the crew among the ships with him; instructing him to signify to the French captain, that I was under a necessity of taking this step from the extraordinary conduct of the captain of the *Licorne*; at the same time recommended to Captain *Hood* to take care, that nothing but the civilest treatment should pass towards the French officers and their people, and every thing taken care of on board the frigate: she is called the *Pallas*, of 32 guns, and 220 men; and, as well as could be learnt, had been eight days from *Brest* on a cruise.

I am, S I R,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

A. K E P P E L.

It is somewhat remarkable, that Admiral Keppel found on board of each of the *Frigates*, *La Pallas* and *La Licorne*, written orders not to molest that useful navigator Captain Cook, on any account whatever, which orders were signed *Sartine*.

The accounts which were published at Paris, on the 22d of June, of the hostilities at sea between the two nations, laid the aggression entirely at our door; and the engagement between the *Arethusa* and the *Belle Poule* was thus related by the French.

“**M**ONS. de la Clocheterie, of the *Belle Poule*, a 34 gun frigate, was met by an English frigate of equal force, who attempted to question the French commander; but on his declining to satisfy the British Captain, the latter insisted that he should go and give a proper account of himself to Admiral Keppel. The Frenchman replied, that he had no account to render to any man but his King and his Admiral. He had scarce made his reply, when the English frigate gave him a broadside, which was immediately returned. Upon this a sharp engagement ensued, which, the weather being very calm, lasted from five o'clock in the evening till very far in the night; when the two ships separated; but not before the *Belle Poule* had silenced the fire of her enemy, which from signals which they afterwards imagined they heard, was left in distress. The Frenchman had 48 men killed, four of whom were officers. The wounded amounted to 50. The lieutenant, Mr. de St. Marceau, lost his arm by a cannon shot, and died of his wounds the same night.”

This aggression, with the taking of the two frigates, was soon followed with the publication of the letters of his most Christian Majesty to the Admiral * of France, which authorises and empowers him to issue out letters of reprisal against the ships of the Subjects of Great Britain.

* H. S. H. The Duke de Penthièvre, father-in-law to the Duke de Chartres.

MY COUSIN,

July 10, 1778.

THE insult offered to my flag by a frigate of the *King of England*, towards my frigate *la Belle Poule*; and the seizure by an English squadron, in violation of the law of nations, of my frigates *la Licorne*, and *la Pallas*, and of my sloop *le Coureur*; the seizure at sea, and the confiscation of the ships belonging to my subjects, committed by *England* against the faith of treaties; the continued disturbance and damage which that power has brought upon the maritime commerce of my kingdom, and of my colonies in *America*, as well by their ships of war, as by their privateers, whom she has authorized and excited to commit these depredations: all these injurious proceedings together, but most particularly the insult offered to my flag, have forced me to set bounds to the moderation I had proposed to myself, and do not permit me any longer to suspend the effects of my resentment; the dignity of my crown, and that protection which I owe to my subjects, demand that I should at length make reprisals, and act hostily against *England*, and that my vessels shall attack and endeavour to take or to destroy all the vessels, or other ships, belonging to the *King of England*; and that they stop and seize alike all the English merchant ships they may have an opportunity of taking. I therefore write you this letter to inform you, that having in consequence given orders to the Commandants of my squadrons, and of my sea-ports, to direct all my Captains of ships to fall upon those of the *King of England*, also upon all ships belonging to any of his subjects, to seize upon and carry them into the ports of my kingdom, my intention is, by way of reprisals for the captures made upon my subjects, by the English privateers and armed vessels, that you will cause to be made out letters of marque and reprisals to those of my said subjects who shall sue for the same, and who are qualified to obtain them, by proposing to fit out ships of war, with sufficient force to protect the crews employed on board the said ships. I rest assured, that I shall find in the justice of my cause, in the valour of my officers, and the equipment of my ships, and in the love of all my subjects, the resources which I have always experienced from them; and my chief confidence is in the protection of the God of Battles; and the present having no other aim, I pray God to take you, my cousin, into his holy keeping. Written at *Versailles* the 10th of July, 1778.

(Signed) L O U I S.

And underneath, D E S A R T I N E.

On the 28th of June, fourteen days before the publication of that letter to the Admiral of France, His most Christian Majesty had written others to the same purpose, amounting also to a declaration of war, to the Governors of his colonies in the West Indies: the *Marquis de Bouillé* Governor of Martinico invaded *Dominica* in consequence of such a letter, which was afterwards published in the French islands, on the 15th August, as follows:

THE insult offered to my flag by a frigate belonging to his *Britannic Majesty*, in her treatment of my frigate the *Belle Poule*; the capture by an English squadron of my frigates the *Licorne* and *Pallas*, and of my cutter, the *Coureur*, contrary to the law of nations; the capture at sea and confiscation of ships belonging to my subjects, by the English, contrary to the faith of treaties; the continual interruption and injury occasioned to the maritime commerce of my kingdom, and of my colonies in *America* as well by ships of war as by privateers, authorized by his *Britannic Majesty*; the depredations committed and encouraged, by which these injurious proceedings, but chiefly the insult offered to my flag, have forced me to lay aside that moderation which I proposed to observe, and will not allow me any longer to suspend the effects of my resentment.

The dignity of my crown, and the protection which I owe to my subjects, oblige me to make reprisals, and to act in a hostile manner against the English nation. I therefore authorise my ships to attack, and endeavour to take and destroy all ships, frigates, and other vessels they may meet with, belonging to the *King of England*, and also to seize and detain all English mercantile vessels which they may encounter; and I likewise authorise my troops to attack, seize, and occupy the possessions of his *Britannic Majesty*.

I therefore write this letter to inform you, that it is my desire, that you employ all the land and sea forces under your direction, in attacking and seizing the possessions of the *King of England*, his ships, frigates, and other vessels, also the merchant ships belonging to his subjects, and for that purpose you may exercise, and cause to be exercised, all manner of hostilities authorised by the laws of war; I am assured in finding in the justice of my cause, in the courage and skill of my land and sea forces; in the bravery and attachment of my soldiers and sailors; and in the love
of

of my subjects in general; the resources which I have always experienced from them, my present conduct having no other tendency than to promote their happiness.

I pray God, *Monsieur le Marquis de Bouillé*, that he may take you under his holy protection.

Verfailles, 28th June, 1778.

(Signed) L O U I S.

DE S A R T I N E.

Many Seizures having been made by the *French* by virtue of the foregoing Letters; his Majesty was pleased to issue his proclamation for granting of *Letters of Marque* and *General Reprisals* for the better security of the trade and commerce of this kingdom.

At the Court of *St. James's*, the 19th of *July*, 1778.

P R E S E N T.

The KING's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS many injuries and acts of hostility have been committed, and many unjust seizures made, by the French King and his subjects, unto and upon the ships and goods of his Majesty's subjects, contrary to the faith of treaties; and whereas his Majesty has lately received advice, that such acts of hostility are now publicly encouraged and authorized by the French King's orders: His Majesty has taken into consideration these injurious proceedings of the French court; and his Majesty, being determined to take such measures as are necessary for vindicating the honour of his crown, and for procuring reparation and satisfaction for his injured subjects, is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, That general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods and subjects of the French King, so that as well his Majesty's fleet and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissioned by letters of marque or general reprisals, or otherwise by his Majesty's commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great-Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels and goods belonging to the French King or his subjects, or others inhabiting within any the territories of the French King, and bring the same to judgment in any of the Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions; and to that end his Majesty's Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draught of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorizing the commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, or any person or persons by them empowered and appointed, to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisal to any of his Majesty's subjects, or others whom the said commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, for the apprehending, seizing and taking the ships, vessels and goods belonging to the French King, and the vassals and subjects of the French King, or any inhabiting within his countries, territories or dominions; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission as have been usual, and are according to former precedents: And his Majesty's said Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are also forthwith to prepare the draught of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorizing the said commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of Great-Britain, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said court, his Surrogate or Surrogates, as also the several courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions, to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon, all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine the same; and according to the course of Admiralty, and the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels and goods as shall belong to the French King, or the vassals and subjects of the French King, or to any others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories and dominions; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission as have been usual, and are according to former precedents. And they are likewise to prepare, and lay before his Majesty at this board, a draught of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the Courts of Admiralty in his Majesty's foreign governments and plantations, for their guidance therein; as also another draught of instructions for such ships as shall be commissioned for the purposes above-mentioned.

Admiral

Admiral Keppel returned to Portsmouth on the 26th of June, and on the 9th July sailed on a second cruise with the following ships under his command.

BRITISH LINE OF BATTLE, on the 9th of JULY, 1778.

STARBOARD DIVISION.

	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Commanders.</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>	
VAN	Monarch	Capt. Rowley	74	600	
	Hector	Sir John Hamilton, Bart.	74	600	
	Centaur	Capt. Cosby	74	600	
	Exeter	Capt. Nott	64	500	
	Duke	Capt. Bréretton	90	750	
	Queen	{ Sir Rob. Harland, Bart. Capt. Prescott }	90	772	{ Vice Adm. of the Red.
	Shrewsbury	Sir John Lockhart Ross, Bart.	74	600	
	Cumberland	Capt. Peyton	74	600	
	Berwick	Hon. Keith Stewart	74	600	
	Stirling Castle	Capt. Lloyd	64	600	

CENTER DIVISION.

CENTER	Courageux	Rt. Hon. Lord Mulgrave	74	600	
	Thunderer	Hon. R. B. Walsingham	74	600	
	Sandwich	Capt. Edwards	90	750	
	Valiant	Hon. J. Leveson Gower	74	650	
	Bienfaisant	Capt. M'Bride	63	510	
	Victory	{ The Hon. Augustus Keppel Rear Adm. Campbell, 1st Capt. to the Admiral Capt. Faulkner }	100	894	{ Adm. of the Blue, and Com. in Ch.
	Foudroyant	Captain Jarvis	80	650	
	Prince George	Sir John Lindsay	90	750	
	Vigilant	Capt. Kingmill	64	500	
	Terrible	Sir Richard Bickerton	74	600	
	Vengeance	Capt. Clements	74	600	

STARBOARD DIVISION.

REAR	Worcester	Captain Robinson	64	500	
	Elizabeth	Hon. Frederick Maitland	74	600	
	Robust	Capt. Hood	74	600	
	Formidable	{ Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart. Capt. Bazely }	90	772	{ Vice Adm. of the Blue.
	Ocean	Capt. Laforey	90	750	
	America	Rt. Hon. Lord Longford	64	500	
	Defiance	Captain Goodall	74	600	
	Egmont	Captain Allen	74	600	
	Yarmouth	Captain Bateman	64	500	
	Ramillies	Captain Digby	74	600	

FRIGATES.

	<i>Guns</i>		<i>Guns</i>
Arethusa	32	Fox	28
Proserpine	28	Andromeda	28
Milford	29	Lively	24

Pluto and Vulcan Fireships, and Alert Sloop.

Note. The Centaur, Worcester, Thunderer, Terrible and Arethusa joined the fleet off Plymouth.

On

On the 8th of July, the French Fleet sailed from the road of Brest : This Fleet was divided into three Squadrons under the command of the *Count D'Orvilliers*, Lieutenant-General, in the following order.

FRENCH LINE OF BATTLE, on the 8th of July, 1778.

VANGUARD, WHITE AND BLUE SQUADRON.

The COUNT DU CHAFAULT DE BESNE', *Lieutenant-general*.

<i>Names of the Ships</i>	<i>Captains</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>
La Couronne	{ Count Du Chaffault Huon de Kermadec }	80	900
Le Duc de Bourgogne	Count de Rochechouart	80	900
Le Glorieux	Chev. de Bauffet	74	800
Le Palmier	De Réal	74	800
Le Dauphin Royal	De Nieul	74	800
Le Bien-Aimé	D'Aubenton	74	800
Le St. Michel	De Mithon	64	650
Le Vengeur	Count d'Amblimont	64	650
L'Actionnaire	De Proilly	64	650

The Commanders of the second and third Divisions of this Squadron were the *Count de Rochechouart*, Admiral, and the *Chev. de Bauffet*, Captain.

CENTER, WHITE SQUADRON.

The COUNT D'ORVILLIERS, *Lieutenant-general*.

La Bretagne	{ Count D'Orvilliers Dupleffis Parfcault }	110	1200
La Ville de Paris	Count de Guichen	92	950
L'Orient	Hector	74	800
Le Fendant	Marquis de Vaudreuil	74	800
Le Magnifique	De Brach	74	800
L'Actif	D'Orves	74	800
L'Artésien	Destouches	64	650
Le Réflecti	Cillart de Juville	64	650
L'Eveillé	De Bodene	64	650
L'Alexandre	De Tremignon	64	650

The Commanders of the second and third Divisions of this Squadron were the *Count de Guichen*, Admiral, and the *Sieur Hector*, Captain.

REAR GUARD, BLUE SQUADRON.

H. S. H. The DUKE DE CHARTRES, *Lieutenant-general*.

Le Saint Esprit	{ Duc de Chartres M. de la Motte-Piquet, Admiral De Monperoux }	80	900
Le Robuste	Count de Grasse	74	800
Le Conquérant	Chev. De Monteil	74	800
L'Intrépide	De Beaufrier	74	800
Le Zodiaque	La Porte-Vezin	74	800
Le Diadème	La Cordonie	74	800
L'Indien	La Grandiere	64	650
Le Roland	L'Archantel	64	650
Le Sphinx	Count de Soulanges	64	650
L'Amphion	De Trobriane	50	540

The Commanders of the second and third Divisions of this Squadron were the *Count de Grasse*, Admiral, and the *Chev. de Monteil*, Captain.

The number of Frigates, Freships, &c. is unknown.

On the 9th the French Fleet being off *Ushant*, the *Curieuse* cutter of ten guns four pounders, commanded by the *Chevalier du Romain*, gave chase to a ship which he saw at a distance, and on coming up with her, ordered her to lie to: this ship, whose flag declared her to be English, would not comply with the order. The frigate *Iphigénie*, commanded by the *Sieur de Kerfaint*, joined the *Curieuse* at this instant; hailed her, and bid the Captain come and speak to the Admiral; on a formal refusal made by the Captain, the *Sieur de Kerfaint* gave orders for firing, and on the first shot the ship struck her colours.

She proved the King's frigate the *Lively*, of 22 guns nine pounders, and 120 men, commanded by Captain *Biggs*. The *Iphigénie* having brought her to the Admiral, the *Count D'Orvilliers* ordered the *Iphigénie* to conduct her to *Brest*, where she arrived on the 10th of July.

The two fleets came in fight of each other on the 23d of July; the British fleet pursued that of France notwithstanding the badness of the weather, till the 27th, when they were brought to an engagement; on which Admiral *Keppel* dispatched Captain *Faulkner* of the *Victory*, with the following account to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

S I R,

Victory, at Sea, July 30, 1778.

MY letters of the 23d and 24th instant, by the *Peggy* and *Union* cutters, acquainted you, for their lordships information, that I was in pursuit, with the king's fleet under my command, of a numerous fleet of French ships of war.

From that time, till the 27th, the winds constantly in the S. W. and N. W. quarters sometimes blowing strong, and the French fleet always to windward going off, I made use of every method to close in with them that was possible, keeping the king's ships at the same time collected, as much as the nature of a pursuit would admit of, and which became necessary from the cautious manner the French proceeded in, and the disinclination that appeared in them to allow of my bringing the king's ships close up to a regular engagement: this left but little other chance of getting in with them, than by seizing the opportunity that offered, the morning of the 27th, by the wind's admitting of the van of the king's fleet under my command leading up with, and closing with, their center and rear.

The French began firing upon the headmost of Vice-Admiral *Sir Robert Harland's* division, and the ships with him, as they led up; which cannonade the leading ships and the Vice-Admiral soon returned, as did every ship as they could close up: the chase had occasioned their being extended, nevertheless they were all soon in battle.

The fleets, being upon different tacks, passed each other very close: the object of the French seemed to be the disabling the king's ships in their masts and sails, in which they so far succeeded as to prevent many of the ships of my fleet being able to follow me when I wore to stand after the French fleet; this obliged me to wear again, to join those ships, and thereby allowed of the French forming their fleet again, and range it in a line to leeward of the king's fleet towards the close of the day; which I did not discourage, but allowed of their doing it without firing upon them, thinking they meant handsomely to try their force with us the next morning; but they had been so beaten in the day, that they took the advantage of the night to go off.

The wind and weather being such that they could reach their own shores before there was any chance of the king's fleet getting up with them, in the state the ships were in, in their masts, yards, and sails, left me no choice of what was proper and adviseable to do.

The spirited conduct of Vice-Admiral *Sir Robert Harland*, Vice-Admiral *Sir Hugh Palliser*, and the captains of the fleet, supported by their officers and men, deserves much commendation.

A list of the killed and wounded is herewith inclosed.

I send Captain *Faulkner*, Captain of the *Victory*, with this account to their lordships,

And am,

S I R,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

A. K E P P E L.

LIST

LIST of Men killed and wounded, in the Action with the French Fleet, the 27th of July, 1778.

<i>Ships Names.</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>
Monarch	2	9
Exeter	4	6
Queen	1	2
Shrewsbury	3	6
Berwick	10	11
Stirling Castle	2	11
Courageux	6	13
Thunderer	2	5
Vigilant	2	3
Sandwich	2	20
Valiant	6	26
Victory	11	24
Foudroyant	5	5
Prince George	5	13
Vengeance	4	18
Worcester	3	5
Elizabeth	—	7
Defiance	8	17
Robust	5	17
Formidable	16	49
Ocean	2	18
America	1	17
Terrible	9	21
Egmont	12	19
Ramillies	12	16
Total	133	375

Officers Wounded.

Lieutenant *Nicholas Clifford*, second of the *Formidable*.
 Lieutenant *William Samwell*, third of the *Shrewsbury*.
 Lieutenant *John M'Donald*, of the marines—*Prince George*.
 Surgeon of the *Elizabeth*.

A. K E P P E L.

The French Admiral's account was published some days after at *Paris*, under the title of *Extrait from the Journal of the King's Naval Army*, as follows :

THE 23d of July, at one o'clock in the afternoon, after a fresh W. N. W. wind, and hazy weather, which had obliged the King's army to stay at the Cape, we perceived, as it cleared up, a great number of sails in the S. W. by W. The army was then, according to estimation, W. N. W. of *Ushant*, at the distance of about thirty leagues of *that island*, and much about the same distance from the *Sorlingues*, which remained N. N. E.

The *Count d'Orvilliers* immediately made a signal to move, and rally the army, in the usual order of battle, the White and Blue Squadron, commanded by the *Count Du-baffault*, in the van, the White Squadron, under the General's flag, in the centre, and the Blue Squadron, commanded by the *Duke de Chartres*, in the rear.

About four o'clock, the wind blowing fresh from the W. the General made a signal for the King's army to tack about ; at the same time the ships we had discovered, were rallying. The wind having shifted to the S. W. these ships tacked about in some disorder, with a view, no doubt, to gain the wind of the King's army. The *Count d'Orvilliers*, who guessed their project, and wanted to preserve the advantage of the wind, made the army tack about, all the ships at once, and run with the four main sails fastened in the fore top masts, and assigned the same manner of failing for the night.

The weather was very stormy, and at one in the morning of the 24th, the gale of wind increasing, the General ordered the army under the low sails ; but as soon as day light appeared, he saw with pain, that the *Duc de Bourgogne*, of 80 guns, and the *Alexandre*, of 64, had

had separated from the army, and were no longer to be seen; nevertheless, as the weather cleared up, the ships that we perceived the day before, were again seen. The *Comte d'Orvilliers* bore down upon them, as well to reconnoitre them, as to rally with more facility the King's army, whose order had been deranged in the night by the thick weather. The frigate *La Sensible*, commanded by the *Chevalier Bernard de Marigny*, was detached to chase forward and reconnoitre more nearly the ships we descried. On the report made by that frigate, the *Comte d'Orvilliers* judged they could be no other than the English army, under the command of Admiral *Keppel*, who, as well as the King's army, were manœuvring to repair the damage of the night. He then made the double signal to tack about by counter march, and range the army in order of battle.

At noon, it blew fresh at W. N. W. and the weather very stormy; the gale still encreasing, as the wind shifted to W. S. W. At seven o'clock the General indicated the four main sails for the night.

The 25th, at four in the morning, the enemy's army remained at E. S. E. four degrees Eastward, at the distance of three leagues; the wind W. S. W. the King's army spent that day in manœuvring to preserve the advantage of the wind.

The 26th, at four in the morning, the English army remained at E. by S. E. five degrees E. at the distance of about two leagues from the King's army; the horizon had cleared up, and seemed to announce fair weather: At eight o'clock, the *Comte d'Orvilliers* made a signal to prepare for an engagement, and at half past ten, another signal to tack about by a counter-march, all sails flying, to preserve the advantage of the wind, receive and afterwards attack the enemy; the horizon soon grew cloudy, the wind rose to the S. W. and veered to the S. S. W. with the appearance of foul weather. The *Comte d'Orvilliers* lost all hopes of fighting for that day.

The 27th, at four in the morning, the wind had shifted to the W. and announced favourable weather. The enemy's army remained at E. N. E. four degrees E. at the distance of two leagues and a half from the King's army. The *Comte d'Orvilliers* made the signal to rally in the usual order of battle; but at nine o'clock, the *Comte d'Orvilliers* observing that the English Admiral was raising his rear to the wind, and willing to make sure of his project, and at the same time draw nearer to the enemy, ordered his army to tack about by counter-march. No sooner was the order of battle formed, than the *Comte d'Orvilliers* plainly perceived that the drift of the English Admiral was to fall on the rear of the French army, and extend his line along side of it. To prevent this, he caused the whole army to tack about at once, with orders to form in order of battle inverted, the Blue Squadron composing the van, the White the centre, and the White and Blue the rear. By this bold manœuvre, which was extremely well executed, he was able to counteract the design of the enemy, to assist the Blue Squadron, and take on the English army the same position that their Admiral wanted to take on the English army, which drew up in good order on that line, at ten quarters offing; and when the head of the enemy's army presented itself to fight, behind the Blue Squadron, they found it on the other side in order of battle, as in reserve for the moment; the White and Blue Squadrons ran at ten quarters offing, and the ships kept too close together on the opposite side to fear that the enemy's line would dare attempt to break through them. The English Admiral then was forced to prolong the French army, and fight along-side of it. The firing began by the Blue Squadron, which formed the van, and continued successively through the whole line, in such manner, that each French ship gave her broad-side to every English ship, and likewise received theirs. The fire was very hot on both sides for about three hours: it appears that the firing of the King's army was served with more vivacity than that of the English army.

The position of the enemy, to leeward, was more advantageous for pointing the guns, and serving the first battery; the *Comte d'Orvilliers*, willing to deprive him of that advantage, made a signal for the Blue Squadron to come up by a successive movement, and then another for the whole army to range itself in order of battle. That movement, which was afterwards well executed, was nevertheless too much delayed to be able to follow the line, and prolong under the wind, from tail to head, the English army, as the General had proposed to do. It is not astonishing that a movement which was instantaneous, and which opportunity gave birth to, was not perfectly laid hold of, at the first instant; but the *Duke de Chartres* having passed under the stern of the General to ask his intention, the *Comte d'Orvilliers* answered, that his intention was to continue the order of battle inverted, by passing under the enemy's wind, to deprive him of the advantage of his position, which was speedily executed. This evolution stopped the English Admiral, whose army had already tacked before the wind by counter march, and was bearing on the tail of the French army, by running in a line, at ten quarters offing. The English Admiral having met with the King's army in battle array, and opposed to his route, was forced to make a retrograde movement, and profiting by his actual position windward of the French army, to rally his own in order of battle on the starboard.

The King's pursued that of England, and constantly offered them battle in the best order, to leeward,

leeward, from two in the afternoon till the next morning; but the English Admiral doubtless did not think fit to accept of it, and availed him of the darkness of the night to effect his retreat, by carefully hiding his fires, whilst all the ships of the King's army carried theirs, that their position might be clearly perceived by the English army.

The 28th at night, the King's army keeping in the latitude of *Ushant*, where they had established their cruize, the astonishment was general when they discovered the isle of *Ushant* itself, which the *Count d'Orvilliers* thought himself distant from, about twenty-five or thirty leagues. It is known that after several days cruize at the mouth of the *Channel*, several of which have been employed in evolutions which do not permit to make an exact calculation of the routs, an error of twenty-five leagues on the longitude is not extraordinary, and that the effects of the currents, not to be estimated in the accounts in those parts, might alone have occasioned it, if other causes had not concurred thereto.

The *Count d'Orvilliers*, seeing himself off the harbour of *Brest*, determined to enter it with his army, as well to put the wounded on shore, as to take such fresh tackle in as some ships might stand in need of, to continue their cruize.

We have not yet a return of the killed and wounded; we only know, that the *Count Duchaffault* received a shot in the shoulder, and the *Chevalier Duchaffault*, his son, on board the same ship, had the small bone of his leg broke.

The number of the killed and wounded in this action was not rendered public before the 18th of August, when the Gazette of France gave the following List of the Officers, Sailors and Marines who were killed and wounded in the sea-engagement on the 27th of July.

<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Killed.</i> <i>Officers.</i>	<i>Killed.</i> <i>Men.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i> <i>Officers.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i> <i>Men.</i>
<i>La Couronne</i>	1	12	<i>La Bretagne</i>	2	19
<i>L'Amphion</i>	1	10	<i>Le Magnifique</i>	2	35
<i>Le Palmier</i>	1	12	<i>La Couronne</i>	8	24
<i>L'Actionnaire</i>	1		<i>Le Fendant</i>	1	25
<i>La Ville de Paris</i>	2	24	<i>La Ville de Paris</i>	1	67
<i>Le Réfléchi</i>	0	9	<i>L'Indien</i>	1	13
<i>Le Glorieux</i>	0	7	<i>Le Palmier</i>	2	25
<i>Le Vengeur</i>	0	5	<i>L'Amphion</i>	5	37
<i>L'Indien</i>	0	6	<i>L'Actif</i>	3	48
<i>L'Actif</i>	0	14	<i>L'Artésien</i>	1	7
<i>Le Sphinx</i>	0	2	<i>L'Orient</i>	0	11
<i>Le Fendant</i>	0	5	<i>Le Vengeur</i>	0	25
<i>Le Magnifique</i>	0	9	<i>Le Robuste</i>	0	9
<i>La Bretagne</i>	0	5	<i>Le Dauphin Royal</i>	0	21
<i>L'Orient</i>	0	6	<i>Le Sphinx</i>	0	14
<i>L'Artésien</i>	0	5	<i>Le Glorieux</i>	0	13
<i>Le Dauphin Royal</i>	0	10	<i>Le Réfléchi</i>	0	46
<i>Le Bien-Aimé</i>	0	10	<i>Le Roland</i>	0	7
<i>Le Saint Esprit</i>	0	1	<i>Le Saint Esprit</i>	0	4
<i>L'Eveillé</i>	0	1	<i>L'Eveillé</i>	0	5
<i>Le Robuste</i>	0	4	<i>Le Bien-Aimé</i>	0	39
<i>Total killed</i>	6	157	<i>Total Wounded</i>	23	496

It was known at the same time, that the ships which had suffered most in the engagement were *la Bretagne*, *la Couronne*, *le Sphinx*, *l'Amphion* and *la Ville de Paris*, especially the three last, among which *la Ville de Paris* had been rendered totally unfit for service.

Besides the publication of the extract sent to the French court by *Count d'Orvilliers*, an abridged account of the engagement, in a letter addressed to the Admiral of France, by *Monsieur De Sartine*, Secretary of State for the Marine Department, was also given to the public, thus

S I R,

WE have gained an advantage over Admiral *Keppel* in an engagement our fleet has had with him, which we may consider rather as a severe check than a victory, in which engagement *Monsieur d'Orvilliers* has given indubitable proofs of his excellent skill, and dexterity; and the *Duke de Chartres* of great presence of mind, tranquility and astonishing courage.

For five days the two fleets were in view of each other, which *Mons. d'Orvilliers* preserved with a view to bring Admiral *Keppel* to an engagement. The sea, however, was so rough and dangerous

dangerous that he could not execute his design, as in that situation he could not make use of his lower guns.

On Monday the 27th, however, *he thought proper to get to the leeward**, which manœuvre he executed within a league and a half of the enemy. The *Duke de Chartres*, who, then found himself commanding the division attacked, prepared for a most vigorous defence, when *Monsi^r d'Orvilliers* with his division, by an entire new manœuvre, tacked to his relief.

The English particularly annoyed the *St. Esprit*. Seven large ships of theirs successively attacked the *Duke De Chartres*, who, notwithstanding being deprived of the use of his lower artillery, answered them with great spirit and vivacity.

A ship of ours † came to the relief of the *St. Esprit* when in very brisk engagement, and threw such a fire on the enemy as obliged them to retire with great loss and damage.

The English fleet passed in review of our whole fleet, the combat having lasted two hours, when *Monsieur d'Orvilliers* gave a signal to form an order of battle, which was executed in an instant.

Our fleet was then to the leeward and could make use of her lower batteries, which they did with small fires from half past two in the afternoon to nine in the evening.

The English Admiral had constantly the wind, and still refused coming to an engagement. In the evening they hoisted their sails, put out fires and fled with nine of their largest ships exceedingly damaged. Our fleet has suffered but little, excepting five ships, which have some need of repairing to stand a battle. *Monsieur d'Orvilliers* finding himself, in the morning, master of the ocean, re-entered *Brest*.

I am, with respect of your Serene Highness,

The most humble and obedient servant,

S A R T I N E.

* This observation is remarkable, and is not mentioned in the journal of the French fleet.—The *Comte d'Orvilliers* wearing had thrown him to leeward, without his being aware of it; but he perceived his mistake in time.

† This was the *Artifex*, whose Captain *Mr. Deshayes*, the *Duchess of Chartres* presented some days after the engagement, with a gold snuff-box, as a reward for his gallant behaviour; but this gentleman declined accepting of it, saying he deserved no recompense for having obeyed the signal of his Admiral.

On the 23d of August, Admiral Keppel sailed from Plymouth with 28 sail of the line, and was joined on the 11th of September by the *Defence*, *Suffolk* and *Egmont*.

BRITISH LINE OF BATTLE of a Squadron of his Majesty's Ships of War, &c. on the 28th of September 1778. The *Monarch* to lead with the Starboard, and the *Ramillies* with the Larboard Tacks on Board.

STARBOARD DIVISION.

	Rates	Ships	Commanders.	Guns	Men
Ships and Frigates out of the Line	3	Monarch	Capt. Rowley	74	600
		Hector	Sir John Hamilton, Bart.	74	600
		Centaur	Capt. Colby	74	600
		Exeter	Capt. Nott	64	500
Fox	Guns 28	2 Duke	Sir Charles Douglas	90	750
		2 Queen	{ Sir Rob. Harland, Bart. Capt. Prescott }	90	772
		3 Shrewsbury	Sir John Lockhart Ross, Bart.	74	600
		Cumberland	Capt. Peyton	74	600
		Berwick	Hon. Keith Stewart	74	600
		Stirling Castle	Capt. Lloyd	64	500

CENTER

CENTER DIVISION.

<i>Ships and Frigates Rates</i>	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Commanders</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>
<i>out of the Line</i>	3 <i>Courageux</i>	Rt. Hon. Lord Mulgrave	74	600
	<i>Thunderer</i>	Hon. R. B. Walsingham	74	600
Porcupine 24	2 <i>Sandwich</i>	Capt. Edwards	90	750
Proserpine 28	3 <i>Valiant</i>	Hon. J. Leveson Gower	74	650
Bienfaitant 64		{ The Hon. Augustus Keppel		
Defiance 64	1 <i>Victory</i>	{ Rear Adm. Campbell, 1st	100	894
Andromeda 28		{ Capt. to the Admiral		
Arethusa 32		{ Capt. Faulkner		
To repeat signals	3 <i>Foudroyant</i>	Captain Jarvis	80	650
Two Fire ships	2 <i>Prince George</i>	Sir John Lindsay	90	750
Vulcan and	3 <i>Vigilant</i>	Capt. King	64	500
Pluto	<i>Terrible</i>	Sir Richard Bickerton	74	600
Five Cutters	<i>Vengeance</i>	Capt. Clements	74	600

*Adm. of the
Blue, and
Com. in Ch.*

LARBOARD DIVISION.

	3 <i>Worcester</i>	Captain Robinson	64	500
	<i>Elizabeth</i>	Hon. Frederick Maitland	74	600
	<i>Resolution</i>	Sir Chal. Ogle, Knight	74	600
	<i>Pobuff</i>	Capt. Hood	74	600
Milford 28	2 <i>Formidable</i>	{ Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart.	90	772
		{ Capt. Bazely		
	<i>Ocean</i>	Capt. Laborey	90	750
	3 <i>America</i>	Rt. Hon. Lord Longford	64	500
	<i>Defence</i>	Captain Cranstone	74	600
	<i>Egmont</i>	Captain Allen	74	600
	<i>Ramillies</i>	Captain Digby	74	600

*Vice Adm.
of the Blue*

In all 31 Ships of the Line of Battle, and 2 a-breadth of the Admiral, and 6 frigates.

In this cruize nothing was seen of the French fleet; which having gone out of Brest on the 18th of August, came in on the 18th of September from *Cape Finisterre*, where they had kept half of the time. The British fleet gave chase twice to the *Refléchi*, and took several West-India-men bound to *Nantes* and *Bourdeaux*. Admiral Keppel receiving intelligence of the French fleet being in Lat. 43° 30' dispatched the *Porcupine* and *Fox* frigates in quest of it. The *Porcupine*, Captain Fiach, parted from the fleet September the 20th, about 10 o'clock P. M. and on the 21st A. M. took the *Modeste* Indiaman, in Lat. 44° 46", and returned with her Prize to *Plimouth* on the 30th, not having seen any thing of the French fleet. The *Fox*, Captain Windsor, was taken by the *Juno*, and carried into *Brest*, from whence Lieutenant Albemarle Bertie wrote the following Letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

S I R,

I AM directed by Captain Windsor, to desire you will inform their lordships, that being ordered by Admiral Keppel to cruize in search of the French fleet, on the 10th of September we perceived, in the N. E. (it being thick squally weather, and we at the same time in chase of a ship and a sloop) a French frigate bearing down upon us, on which we shortened, and engaged her for three hours and a half. Having lost all our masts, most of our guns disabled, and the enemy being perfectly in a condition to continue the action, we were obliged to strike to the *Juno*, who has brought us into *Brest*. The reason of my writing is, that Captain Windsor has a musquet ball in his right arm, one of the bones of which it has splintered; it was not till last night the ball could be extracted; at present there is no fear of his losing his arm. Captain Windsor is slightly wounded in four other places. The *Juno* is commanded by the Viscount de Beaumont. She fought on each side fourteen 12 pounders, six 6 pounders, and had 333 men.

Captain Windsor particularly desires me to mention, that attention and civility has been paid to himself and his officers, particularly by *Monsieur de Beaumont*, and *Monsieur la Porte*, the intendant, at whose house he is at present lodged. The greatest care has likewise been taken of the sick and wounded. I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

A. BERTIE.

On board the *Fox*,
Brest, Sept. 20, 1778,

The

The nearest account I can give of the killed and wounded is,

Killed	—	—	—	11
Dead of their wounds	—	—	—	3
W O U N D E D.				14
Captain <i>Windsor</i>	—	—	—	1
Lieutenant <i>Wilson</i> , of marines, recovering	—	—	—	1
Midshipmen	—	—	—	2
Boatswain	—	—	—	1
Seamen and marines	—	—	—	21
Wounded				32
Killed				14
Total				46

Note, The *Fox* had twenty-four 9 pounders, four 3 pounders, and 200 men.

About a month after the taking of the *Fox*, an engagement happened on the coast of Spain, between the King's ship the *Jupiter* and the French ship *Le Triton*; though the *Jupiter* was no part of Admiral *Keppel's* fleet, her engagement belongs to the Campaign, and we have subjoined here the following extract of a letter from Captain *Reynolds* to Mr. *Stephens*, dated *Lisbon Harbour*, November 29, 1778.

ON the 20th of October, being in company with his Majesty's ship *Medea*, and off the island of *Sizarga* at one in the afternoon, we gave chase to a ship to leeward, the wind being westerly, and about six in the evening came to action with a French man of war, which continued close for two hours, when the enemy dropt astern, and being close in with the land, I was under the necessity of hauling off; in order to clear it, at which time the night being very dark, and blowing fresh, we lost sight of the enemy, as also of the *Medea*. Mr. *Law*, midshipman, and two seamen, were killed, and eight badly wounded, in which number I include the master, Mr. *Roberts*, who, with two seamen, died the next day of their wounds; the others, I have the pleasure to add, are in a fair way of recovery. Our masts, yards, sails, and rigging were much damaged. I am to desire you will please to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the officers and ship's company behaved with much spirit, and kept up a well directed fire during the whole time. I have since been informed, that the ship we engaged was the *Triton*, of 64 guns commanded by *Monf. de Ligondé*, who had 13 men killed, and 30 wounded, and who received much damage, and was obliged to put into *Cornwall*.

N. B. The *Jupiter* had 50 guns, and 350 men.

Admiral *Keppel* returned to *Portsmouth* on the 26th of October.

Soon after the return of this fleet, the following paragraph appeared in the *Morning Intelligencer*.

THE principal cause of Mr. *Keppel's* not re-attacking the French at half past three in the afternoon (being at this time totally refitted from the damages sustained in the morning) was Sir *H—P—*'s not joining him, agreeable to signal, to form the line, he being at that time four miles to windward with his division. Mr. *Keppel*, observing a non-compliance, made other signals for the respective ships of Sir *H—*'s division to bear down to him, which in complying with, Sir *H—* called them back under his wake. Captain *Laforey*, of the *Ocean*, distressed how to act in consequence of this counter-order, failed up to Sir *H—*, to ask whom he was to obey. Mr. *Keppel* still observing that division continuing to windward, and neither of them obeying the signal, made one for the *Fox*, Captain *Windsor*, to come to him, and desired him to go with his compliments to Sir *H—*, to inform him that his signal had been unremittedly kept up for him and his division to form the line; he supposed they did not see it, as they had not complied with it, and that they only waited for him and his division's coming down, to renew the action. It was night before the division did come down, so the occasion was lost, by the French disappearing next morning. Mr. *Keppel's*

pel's situation is not to be expressed, when he found himself defeated in the fair prospect he had. These facts will appear in every log-book in the fleet; so that if an enquiry into this affair was to take place, his conduct would bear the strictest scrutiny, as hitherto no visible reason has appeared as an excuse in Sir H—— P—— for not complying. Sir Robert Harland's division, and Mr. Keppel's, who had sustained, to all appearance, as much damage as Sir H——'s, those two divisions were refitted for action at the time above-mentioned, and Sir H—— had not repaired his, lying all the time with his fore-top-sail shattered, and not refitted. The damage sustained of loss of men on board Sir H——, was chiefly owing to cartridges blowing up between decks.

To this paragraph Sir *Hugh Palliser* made the following reply, which was printed in all the newspapers, and gave occasion to the Court-Martial,

MR. PRINTER,

HAVING seen since my late arrival at *Portsmouth*, a very scandalous paragraph in the *Morning Intelligencer* of the 15th of last month, directly charging me with being the cause of Admiral Keppel's not re-attacking the French fleet, in the afternoon of the 27th of July last, containing many gross falsehoods, calculated expressly for the purpose of wounding my reputation, and to represent me in a culpable light to the whole nation: and being well informed that injurious reports of the like nature have been industriously propagated for the same purpose by some malignant wicked people, it becomes necessary for me, in order to vindicate my own conduct, to publish such particulars relating to the battle on that day, as may enable the public who have a right to be fully informed of the truth in a matter of so much importance to them, to judge whether I was the cause of the French fleet not being re-attacked on that afternoon; I therefore request you will publish the inclosed paper, containing the facts necessary to be known, for justifying me from the said foul aspersions. After the nation is in possession thereof, if any individual, or if Parliament, or the nation at large call for a public enquiry, I am ready to stand the issue of such enquiry; but I shall not answer any questions, or queries in news-papers, or otherwise.

Yours, &c.

Pall-Mall, November 4.

HUGH PALLISER.

AT about six o'clock in the morning on the 27th of July; the British fleet was upon a wind on the larboard tack, lying up about W. by N. my division leading on that tack, the French fleet was to windward; at half past six a signal was made for several of the ships of my division to chase to windward; which occasioned them to stretch far a-head.

At ten the whole fleet tacked together per signal, and stood towards the French fleet, who soon after were plainly discovered to be on the larboard tack, in a regular, well formed close line of battle a-head; our fleet approached them without any order or line of battle. The ships of my division were separated from me by the above signal; the ships of the other two divisions, though not in a regular line, appeared to be nearly so, and in a collected body, excepting the *Duke*, who was far to leeward.

About eleven a firing began between the headmost ships in our Van and some ships in the Van of the enemy's fleet, which became general as our ships got up in succession: each proceeding from that part of the enemy's fleet, which they respectively fetched, on towards the enemy's rear, engaging as they advanced along their line.

Admiral Keppel with his division fetched the French Admiral, and there began to engage.

About noon, in the *Formidable*, I fetched within random shot of the *D. de Chartres* ship who commanded the van division of the enemy's fleet; he fired many broadsides at the *Formidable*, but being at too great a distance, she did not return a single shot, but reserved her fire till she came within point blank shot of the ship she could fetch; there I began to engage, and passed on to the French Admiral in the centre of the line, engaging within musket shot, and alone; having no second either a-head or a-stern, the ships of my division being scattered and separated from me by signal as aforementioned: however, they all got into action, and though not in a connected body with their Admiral, did their duty so well, that they suffered the most, as appears by the damages sustained by those ten ships, being equal to the damages sustained by all the twenty ships that composed the other two divisions. This was occasioned by the regular and connected line of the enemy's ships being preserved; whereby they were enabled to employ a greater force upon each ship in the rear of our fleet, who were separated at a considerable interval from each other, occasioned by the before-mentioned signal to chase, and from hence arose the numerous damages which the *Formidable* sustained, being subjected to the angular fire of a long range of the enemy's ships as she

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continued

continued her progress along their line. This comparison of the damages appears by the account published from Admiral Keppel's letter of the killed and wounded, which was as follows :

Admiral Keppel's division, 43 killed, and 142 wounded.

Vice Admiral Sir Robert Harland's division, 22 killed, and 45 wounded.

Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser's division, 68 killed, and 186 wounded.

By the blowing up of some powder on board the *Formidable*, about 20 men were hurt, but I do not recollect that any one was killed thereby. The accident was occasioned by a man having a cartridge under his arm at the time he fired his gun. It is said the like accident happened on board other ships.

I proceeded on with the *Formidable* to the sternmost of the enemy's ships, keeping my mizen top-sail a-back all the time, and engaged every ship within gunshot, the two last of which appeared not to have sustained any damage from any of our ships that had passed before us, not a shot-hole being to be seen in their sails : the *Formidable* brought down one of the enemy's ships main-yard, which ship appeared to be otherwise much damaged, for she quitted their line, and went off before the wind, attended by a frigate.

Between two and three o'clock, I had passed the sternmost ship of the enemy's line ; at this time admiral Keppel was at a distance, coming up, and a number of ships about him, and I think, with the signal for battle flying. I concluded he was advancing to renew the battle : vice-admiral Sir Robert Harland was, with several ships to windward of the rear of the enemy. I immediately wore the *Formidable* and laid her head toward the enemy again, in order to endeavour to get into battle again, expecting it to be renewed when Admiral Keppel came up. We were then exactly in a line with the enemies line, and at about random shot from their sternmost ships. In this situation the *Formidable* lay a considerable time, no other ship near her. Soon after this the van and centre of the enemy broke their line, and appeared to be in confusion ; some with their heads one way, some another.

The *Victory* shortened sail, and unbent her main top-sail ; and about this time some of the enemy's ships appeared to be filing off towards us, and two or three of their fresh ships standing directly for the *Formidable* ; I therefore wore again, and laid her head towards Admiral Keppel to meet him.—then the enemies ships edged away, and pointed to leeward of our fleet, and began to form the line in that direction.

When the *Victory* and *Formidable* met, it was past three o'clock ; the *Victory* passed the *Formidable* to windward, wore, passed under her stern, run down to leeward of her, and made sail a-head ; this left the *Formidable* at a distance a-stern, and somewhat to windward of the *Victory*'s wake, though the least so of any ship when she first hauled the wind. A signal was made for ships to windward to bear down into the Admiral's wake, which signal I repeated ; for it was understood to be for Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland and his division to bear down, who was then far to windward ; and he accordingly did bear down and brought up in the Admiral's wake, then nearly a-breast of the *Formidable*, and a little way to leeward of her.

At this time it was apparent to the rest of the fleet (if it was not so to those in the *Victory*) that the *Formidable* was not in a manageable condition ; we were then employed in knotting, splicing, &c. to get the ships under command, and to be able to make sail to get up with the Admiral, who was making sail on the starboard tack, the French fleet then after doing the same.

After Sir Robert Harland had been for some time in the Admiral's wake, he with his division (by orders, it is said) crowded all the sail they could carry, to get a-head of the Admiral's division.

Late in the evening we saw the Admiral had made the signal for some particular ships of my division (not the *Formidable*, her incapacity being so apparent) all which signals I repeated ; the *Ocean*, and such of them as were under command, bore down according to the signal ; others were not in a governable condition, and being employed as I was, in knotting, splicing, &c. did not immediately bear down. It is to be observed, that the *Formidable*, and the ships of my division, were the last that came out of the engagement, were the most damaged, and had had least time to refit ; and that it is the disabled ships of my division that are alluded to in Admiral Keppel's letter, where he says, " the object of the French seemed to be the disabling of the king's ships in their masts and sails ; in which they so far succeeded, as to prevent many of ships of my fleet being able to follow me when I wore to stand after the French fleet, &c."

If, according to the preceding paragraph, extracted from the Admiral's own account, they were unable to follow him, going towards the enemy, they certainly were equally unable to follow him, when he immediately made sail the contrary way, and it was unreasonable to suppose them capable of tacking, and keeping their stations in a line of battle, at a cable's length asunder, whilst in that condition.

Can any one possibly believe (as the dark assassin asserts) that Admiral Keppel called those same crippled ships to him, in order to renew the attack, and at the moment when he had just sent Sir Robert Harland away from him, with his division of fresh ships, who had been the longest out

out of the action, and had had the most time to repair their damage? besides, the Admiral's letters declare that it was not his intention to re-attack before the next morning.

At night the *Fox* frigate, Captain *Wadfor*, came to the *Formidable*, with a message from the Admiral to me, "that he wanted the ships of my division to come into his wake;" but said not a word about his waiting for them, in order to renew the attack, as is falsely asserted. He was answered by myself, from the stern gallery, in the following words: "acquaint the Admiral 'I have repeated his signal for it;' and was going to say, 'tell him that the moment my ship is under command, I will endeavour to get nearer to him.'" But the company of the frigate interrupted, by giving three cheers, which the *Formidable's* people returned. It then blew fresh, was dark, and the frigate passed so quick, that there was not time to say any thing more which could have been heard.

The night was cloudy, with rain, and very dark; it required all the tattered sails the *Formidable* could possibly set in the afternoon, and in the night to keep way with the Admiral, so that we could only spare one top-sail at a time to be unbended, in order to bend others. After we had knotted and spliced as much rigging as we could to secure the masts, and make it safe to set sail upon them, and having shifted a fore and mizen top-sail, the ship was then under command, and, long before day-light, the *Formidable*, and every ship of my division were in the Admiral's wake, expecting to engage immediately at day-light, but the enemy's fleet were gone off.

O B S E R V A T I O N S.

THREE different Plans have appeared in France of the engagement off *Ushant*: the first was done at Paris by Monsieur *Brion de la Tour*, *Ingénieur Géographe du Roi*; it is a mere catchpenny, without any sense or meaning.

The two others are anonymous, but have been published by order of the Ministry, one at Paris, the other at *Brest*; and are both inserted in the present work; that which is marked No. I. is the least defective; the second is said to be *done according to the English Narrative*: its author has given with it an explanatory letter written from one end to the other, in that ironical style called *Periflage* by the French, and of late so much in vogue among the Ministers of that country, that there is nothing else in their Ambassador's *Rescript* to the British Court, dated *March 13*. This most curious letter is dated off *Ushant*, 9th *August*, 1778, on board a French Squadron that was not there. The republication of such a performance is needless, but we cannot forbear mentioning some of the glaring absurdities which swarm through the whole.

The FRENCH Pamphleteer.

P. 6. We could not have imagined that the return of our ships to *Brest* 24 hours after the flight of yours would have given you a pretence to impose on your nation.

P. 7. You say that 'till the 27th of July the French declined the Combat: why then did you take shelter in the Channel, of which they guarded the entrance, where you knew they would not go?

P. 9. The retiring of the French at the time of the gale on the 23d could have no object in view, but that indispensable one their safety; and the same strong north-westerly wind that drove them out to Sea, made you leave the Channel, in like manner for your safety, and when you well knew that the French could no longer be in the way to prevent your coming out.

P. 9. The French were so far from declining the combat that they only *manœuvred* in order to engage on the 27th.

They forced you to it, when the two fleets being on the same tack, the French wore on the opposite tack.

STRICTURES by J. M.

Cast your eyes on the first Chart, and compare the *date* and the *tracks*.

The French being to *windward* of the King's fleet, they had it in their power at any hour from the 23d to have engaged them. When the English on the 27th happened to be to *windward* in their turn, the judicious author says, p. 15, *The French General to leeward not being able to come up with you, as you did not chuse it in vain urged you to a Combat which then depended only upon you.*—As for the French keeping the entrance of the Channel, the first Chart proves it to admiration.

See the first Chart again, and you will wonder at the nonsense heaped in this Paragraph concerning the Channel: but the effect attributed to the Wind, is still more curious; for it is the first time that ever any body knew a N. W. wind was supposed to blow a *Brest* fleet to sea.

One may reasonably suppose that fleets intending to engage, especially when they have the weather gage, do not require four days to *manœuvre*.

There is also a mistake here; the fact being that the *French Fleet*, by the circumstances of the wind's shifting two or three points, could not avoid the English fleet falling in with them in the manner described in the *first Plan*.

N. B. Let us observe here that in both the French plans the direction of the wind is falsely expressed.

P. 13. Several of your ships were dismantled.

You scruple not to say that in this situation the French *formed the line*, and afterwards that they declined a second engagement. This contradiction is manifest.

Not a single one.

Not so manifest as the motives for the conduct of the French fleet, which to do them justice deserved pain. They could not with safety renew the action without forming the line, nor could they do that without running to leeward. They were then certainly in the most advantageous situation to receive a re-attack of the English fleet; and their keeping in that position in excellent order, was a prudent cover, for their intended flight in the dark, as it apparently wore the face of an intention to renew the action, or, at least, a disposition to *receive* battle a second time. Had they fled immediately after the action, it must have been attended with the certain destruction of part of their fleet, their sternmost ships.

Those Lights were hanged out for the purpose of deceiving the English fleet; three of the best sailing ships in the French fleet kept their stations till the next morning, to cover the flight of the rest.

Mr. *Burke* observed in the House of Commons, that those Lights must have dazzled the French; and that they were not of great service in shewing them their way, since their fleet ran 30 leagues more to the East than they expected.

The English fleet lay too the best part of the next day, and were about 20 miles further to the southward.

After quitting the field of battle, after having been forced to a first combat in line of battle, when you only fought to surprise a rear-guard, after avoiding a second action, after having fled a whole night without lights towards Plymouth, and afterwards still farther to Portsmouth.

P. 17. The French General remained all the day of the 28th in the *same waters* where he had fought.

If reversed for the conduct of the French it will be literally true.

The English never went to *Portsmouth*, and might have been at *Plymouth* in a third of the time. See the *1st Chart*.

'This means without doubt the *waters of the Atlantic Ocean*, which certainly run into Brest harbour: for the French Admiral says in his journal, "the 28th, at night, the King's army keeping in the latitude of *Ushant*, where they had established their cruise, the astonishment was general; when they discovered the isle of *Ushant* itself, which the *Count d'Orvilliers* thought himself distant from, about 25 or 30 leagues."

These 25 or 30 leagues the witty author makes them vanish in an instant; what will the *twenty thousand men* say that were so astonished when they discovered *Ushant* on the 28th at night?

I believe this is an error of the press—read *be ordered his frigates to follow him*.

He ordered his frigates to follow you.

I was

When

G

I was in pursuit, you make your Admiral say, of a numerous fleet of French ships of war. What! *in the Channel?* which they had not entered; which you left only by the same winds which had driven them away, and to avoid the same dangers of the coast? you did not pursue them in the Channel, where they were not; the battle was fought *at the entrance of the Channel.*

When Admiral Keppel wrote he was not in the Channel, but in the Atlantic without Scilly.

It was fought a degree and a half to the westward of Scilly, and in the latitude of 48 deg. 30 min. nearly.

This paragraph is a repetition of the nonsense already quoted concerning the Channel; we refer the patient reader to the *First Chart*; confessing ingenuously at the same time, that we have not courage enough to proceed farther in the analysis of that performance; which, to make use of its author's expression, page 31, does not appear to be the *happiest movement of the political springs of the French Ministers.*

The Author concludes with the following Note :

" A foreigner arrives at London: in that City which, as every one knows, is perfectly free, he meets ten times in an hour, *press-gangs* pursuing passengers in order to make them soldiers or sailors, by dint of Bastinadoes: the next day he goes to Portsmouth, embarks on board a ship, and there finds half those involuntary heroes chained down in the hold; two days after he lands at Brest; the sailors who arrive there *unguarded and unconstrained*, are disputing the honour of being first embarked; he goes from ship to ship, and every where sees, in animated colours, the stamp of courage and freedom. Two gentlemen of Bretagne tendered themselves as volunteers; the General refused them: they offered to pay for the discharge of two soldiers, and to serve in their room; all the soldiers refused. The foreigner in four days forms a judgment of the two nations, and prefaces with certainty the fate of their arms."

That the pressing of sailors for manning our fleets in time of war, is attended with several inconveniencies, and many acts of cruelty, there is not the least doubt; and so far the French wit may be right. The principle upon which this violent method has been justified, is very ancient, *salus populi suprema lex esto.* No Englishman ought to be told that without very powerful fleets that may be manned immediately, on any sudden emergency, the independence of his country is at an end. By means of the *Press* our armaments acquire an activity that is unknown abroad, and which according to the French themselves, is peculiar to our Navy. Sailors on board our men of war have a preferable allowance, and a pay little inferior to those given by merchantmen, where the danger is equal, if not more considerable than in the royal navy, when once hostilities are begun. And this consideration might be adduced to exculpate in some degree the method of Pressing; the proportion adopted by the French, between the royal pay and merchants wages, is a great deal lower, and much more unfavourable to sailors than ours.

Observe also, that in this country *pressed* seamen have the same means of raising themselves, as those who enter volunteers; and every body knows that one of the most distinguished Admirals now in our Navy, has been pressed in Scotland, at the beginning of the war before last.

The French author may ridicule our practice of recruiting sailors among landmen, but the fact is, that no nation understands the method of training and making sailors so well as the English, and that six months of discipline and exercise on board one of our men of war are equivalent in that respect to twelve months on board a ship of any Navy in Europe. Does the author think that in his country the registered *Bargemen* of the Seine, the Loire, the Garonne, the Dordogne, &c. who never saw the sea in their lives, are better than our Landmen? When Mr. Luttrell in the House of Commons made his memorable parallel between the English and the French Navies, he unhappily forgot this circumstance of the French Bargemen who are very numerous, and full as good sailors as our Oxford Bargemen.

That the French sailors arrive at Brest *UNGUARDED*, is very true, as the note says, but it is not so certain that they come *UNCONSTRAINED*. Indeed they are not *pressed* in the streets, nor in the public houses, nor on board merchant ships; the French know better; they *press* them in their Cradle; the moment they are born, they belong to the Royal Navy, and their whole number compose a kind of *Cbuma* which is moved or renewed at the nod of the Ministry and their subalterns. One would think that activity at least should be the result of a method that

that requires so few means to be put in execution; but the rest of the machinery has been so complicated, that its movement is retarded in the same proportion as the component parts are multiplied.—The French sailors arrive at Brest *unarmed*!—who can doubt this? The Guards, the *Archers de la Marine*, the *Marechaussée*, the *Commis*, the *Commissaires des Classes*, &c. &c. &c. all those people are waiting for them in their respective Departments, and are sure of finding them out every where. Let one of those *unarmed* and *unconstrained* sailors return home, or into another district, without leave, and you shall see, in *animated colours*, how kindly he will be received.

The French sailors, to free themselves of the enlisting and registering, and of the Intendants and their clerks, generally leave the kingdom, and desert in great numbers. “It is true, that our seamen have one disadvantageous quality, which is, that on the slightest discontent they withdraw, and go into foreign service.” So said Mr. *Deflandes* in his Essay on Maritime Power and Commerce; a work which was published about the year 1742, by order and under the patronage of the Count de Maurepas then Minister of the Marine of France.

If the enlisting, registering and classing of seamen in France, is not followed, in respect to the manning and fitting out of Fleets, with that activity which at first should be expected; we might say also that, from the very principle of classing, the crews of the Royal Fleet can never acquire that degree of practice, experience and discipline necessary to insure them a constant equality with our fleets. The whole number of sailors in each district being to serve on board the Fleet by rotation, the several crews are to be dismissed when the campaign is over, and fresh ones introduced. This continual renewing deprives then the ships not only of the most hardy and experienced seamen, but also, which is worst, it deprives them of their crews trained up and accustomed together; and this must be felt with more disadvantage in ships fitted out for the Bay or for Channel service where the campaigns are shorter.

The want of emulation among seamen in France is another great cause of the precariousness of the Royal Navy of that kingdom. Their first and grand rule is, that all the officers are to be taken exclusively out of the body of the Noblesse. Their nursery is in the *Garde-marines*, a set of young gentlemen remarkable in all Europe for their want of discipline and subordination. This Gothic institution has been modelled upon that of the Knights of Malta, who, towards the middle of the last century, had the greatest reputation at sea, where they are at present scarcely known. The French Noblesse are extremely tenacious of this prerogative; they appropriate it to younger brothers who in general fill up the French Marine; and by means of their influence at Court they are pretty sure of keeping it for ever, or at least as long as there is a Navy or a Noblesse. Mr. *Deflandes*, in the book which we have already quoted, could not help speaking on that subject: “I ought not (says he in the 3d part) to forget here a question that has been often handled among the English. They enquire whether the gentry are fitter for maritime service, than soldiers of fortune, who have nothing to subsist on but their merit or experience? and with them it seems to be decided in favour of the latter. It is true, according to Cardinal de Richelieu*, that all men being equal by nature, must suffer, with regret, that difference which protection and riches put between them. It is also true, that many, who are obliged to give way, blame with reason those who command them, and shew, that though they are inferior to them in power, yet in merit they surpass them.

“But without weighing critically, what perhaps belongs in a peculiar manner to England, I shall only say that in France the Marine has gained considerably since it has been composed of select youths, and of officers chosen out of the best families. It is not that I would exclude certain men, who may be said to be privileged, and who indemnify themselves from an obscure birth, by a display of talents superior to any birth.

“Nobility, without doubt, owes its splendor to fair and generous actions; but as it degenerates every day, ought we to complain that such actions are revived, and appear in other men. The nobility bribe and intrigue, in order to acquire charges and employments, without ever thinking how to merit, or how to execute them. What madness in these vain men! Their ancestors have left them, it is true, all that depended on them, riches, great names, and shining titles, but they have not left them personal merit; that lay beyond the extent of their power. That alone they could not communicate; that alone is the thing not hereditary. They say that I am a brutish fellow, and without the least tincture of good manners, because I am ashamed to own a buffoon for my companion, disdain either shewy or effeminate pleasures, and give less wages to my cook than to any other of my domestics. What mighty crimes! and yet they are all mine.

“I thought this eulogium due to several officers of great merit, who have rendered the Marine illustrious by so many happy campaigns; and who, in spite of the obstacles they met with at every turn, in spite of their rivals, who seem to block up their way to preferment, have acquired it notwithstanding, and that too with the highest applause; such, even in late times, was M. Du Gué-Trouin as much distinguished by his undaunted bravery as by his fu-

* And Common Sense.

“ perior capacity; who exposed himself rapidly and boldly to all sorts of dangers; even to those which he had not foreseen, and which his intrepidity seemed to ward off, by not suffering them to confound him.”

Thus far Mr. *Defflandes*, who from the tenor of his discourse seems to have disapproved as much as he could safely do it in his country, the method adopted in the French Marine. But what must have been his reflections, had he seen the wonderful operations of that Marine during the last war? if the author of the Pamphlet that has given rise to our remarks, had recollected those wonders, methinks he would have been a little more sparing of his pleasantries concerning the *Heroes of Saratoga*, for without partiality, the Noble Heroes of the *River Vilaine* are still more heroic than those of *Hudson's River*.

A fact well established is, that no *Roturier*, or commoner, can rank as an officer in the French Navy; and what is very singular, the greatest sea-officers of whom France can boast, have come out of the vulgar class. It is true, that having displayed amazing talents, and performed exploits almost incredible, the national cry in their favour silenced the gothic prejudice of the *Noblesse*, who consoled themselves in giving those *Soldiers of fortune*, as they are called by Mr. *Defflandes*, the name of *Intruders*. But as it happens very unfortunately, that almost the whole practice and experience in navigation constantly reside in the officers of merchant ships who are all *Roturiers*; the *Noblesse* have consented lately to suffer some of these on board each ship of war, to assist and help under the name of *Auxiliary Officers*. The *Auxiliary Officers*, heretofore the *Blue Officers*, do not belong to the *Corps de la Marine*; consequently they are not entitled to any of the military recompences, preferments, and pensions attributed exclusively to that *Corps*. Let them even display a continual superiority of skill, bravery, and activity, they have scarce any chance of being promoted to the rank of king's officer. Such an arrangement may for a while give a kind of energy to the French Fleets; it may procure them some transitory success; but it is not in the nature of things that it should produce permanent effects, or such as might endanger the superiority of the British Navy; on the contrary it is evident, that animosities, jealousies, and discontents must result unavoidably from this childish and humiliating distinction of officers.

It appears very plain, in reading the naval history of *France*, that the Ministers of the marine department in that country, from the end of the last century to the present hour, have done all in their power to have neither able Seamen, nor skilful Officers; and the most absurd of their edicts are generally those of the later date. If any body should question this assertion, we might quote the new edition of the Ordinance of Lewis the XIV in 1689, with all the revisions, additions, and other curious embellishments; we should quote the last curious Declaration for the encouragement of privateering, with all its articles, sections, and paragraphs. It is true, that this Declaration has done less mischief than any other; for by a strange fatality having been found to discourage privateering, it has at least saved some thousand of Frenchmen from being made prisoners, and some hundreds of our merchantmen from being captured. The little island of *Guernsey* has actually more privateers at sea than the whole kingdom of *France*; and during the last war, (when unluckily for us there was no encouraging Declaration) at the same time, that 30000 French sailors were prisoners in *England*; the ports of *France* had then above 150 privateers at sea, a third of which belonged to *St. Malo's* and *Bayonne*, which two maritime cities have fitted out, between them, only seven privateers since the commencement of the present hostilities.

It must be said however, in justice to the French Ministry, that this encouraging Declaration, as well as many others, seems to have been dictated by the officers of the Navy, who not disdaining always the sweets of privateering, were desirous of having but few competitors in that branch. But from all this, and after having very attentively examined the actual strange composition of the Marine of *France*, we cannot help saying, as *Jean Jacques Rousseau* when he was exclaiming against the Music of that country: *You have no Marine; you cannot have a Marine; and if you have a Marine, so much the worse for you.*



F I N I S.

**THE CRUISE
OF THE KING'S FLEET,**

Commanded by ADMIRAL KEPPEL,

From the 17th to the 31st of July 1778.

with the Situation of the FLEET
at the time of the ACTION, on the 27 of July,


By J.M. a Lieutenant in the Fleet.

— Course of the British Fleet.

— the British Fleet every Day at Noon.

— Course of the French Fleet, from the Journal of Count d'Orvilliers.

Engraved & Published Jan^y 7. 1779 by Wth FADEN Charing Cross.



THE CRUISE OF THE KING'S FLEET,

Commanded by ADMIRAL KEPPEL,

From the 26th of August to the 27th of October 1778.


By J. M. a Lieutenant in the Fleet.

The Fleet every Day at Noon.

August.
September.
October.

Conjectural Cruise of the French Fleet, from the imperfect and contradictory Accounts published at Paris.

Engraved & Published Jan^y 1779 by W^m FADEN, Charing Cross.



on the 27th of July 1778, Before and During the Engagement.

Engraved & Published Jan^y 7. 1779, by W^m FADEN, Charing Cross.
as the Act directs.

about 10 o'Clock

The Enemy's Warring having thrown them far to Leeward, and the Wind veering from S.W. by S. to S.W. by W. the British Admiral is enabled to fetch them; the whole Fleet Tack per Signal and give Chase.

Between 7 and 8 Miles
from 8 o'clock

*Formidable
begins to engage
a boat after 12, at
B where was also the
French King*

Engagement ceases

French Van Engagement begins

**French Fleet S.W. by W.
about 8 Miles to Headward**

From 4
to
8 o' Clock
9 Miles

*Signal is made for several Ships of
the Rear or Vice-Admirals Division
to Chase to Windward*

July 27.th A Clock in the Morning
the King's Fleet
upon a Wind on the Landed Tack.

July 27th 4 o'Clock in the Morning,
the French Fleet W.S.W.or S.W.by W.
about 9 Miles to Windward.

About $\frac{1}{2}$ after 10


S.W. by The French Admiral, in consequence of the Manner of the British Fleet perceiving his mistake, Jacks in confusion to the N.W. and the Two Fleets are brought within 3 Miles of each other at AA about 11 o'Clock.

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE KING'S FLEET


AGAINST THE FRENCH FLEET

on the 27th of July 1778, After the Engagement.

Engaged & Published as the Act directs Jan^y 7th 1779, by W. FADEN, Charing Cross.



PLAN OF THE SEA ENGAGEMENT Fought on the 27th of July 1778. BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS. *Copy'd out and Translated from the French Plan Published at Paris by Order of the Ministry.*



PLAN of the SEA ENGAGEMENT Fought on the 27th of July, 1778. BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.
Copy'd out and Translated from the French Plan published at Brest by Order of the Ministry.

